Yuji Fujinaka

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (with Toshiji Miyakawa), (July 24, 2017, SSRN)
This paper is a revised version of "A model of housing markets with interdependent values" (Jan 26, 2015, SSRN)
Choosing someone with monetary transfers: a comprehensive analysis (with Toyotaka Sakai and Shin Sakaue)
Nash implementation and single-peaked preferences (with Tokinao Otaka and Shuta Terui), (Jan 4, 2017, SSRN)
A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for fair division, (Dec 5, 2008)
This paper was formerly entitled ``Efficiency, envy-freeness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility in economies with one indivisible good and money."

Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (with Takuma Wakayama)
forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
working paper: (April 11, 2018, SSRN); (July 1, 2017, SSRN)
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (with Takuma Wakayama)
Journal of Economic Theory (2015) Vol 158, Part A, 165-185
working paper: (March 6, 2015, SSRN); (May 5, 2012, SSRN); (May 13, 2011, DP2011-02)
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (with Takuma Wakayama),
Economic Theory (2011) Vol 48-1, 147-169
The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation (with Toyotaka Sakai),
International Journal of Game Theory (2009) Vol 38-3, 325-348
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money (with Takuma Wakayama),
Economics Letters (2008) Vol 100-1, 91-95; Supplementary note (Sep 27, 2007)
The manipulability of fair solutions in assignment of an indivisible object with monetary transfers (with Toyotaka Sakai),
Journal of Public Economic Theory (2007) Vol 9-6, 993-1011
Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money (with Toyotaka Sakai),
Economics Letters (2007) Vol 94-2, 253-258