Shingo Ishiguro (Ph. D)

Professor

Graduate School of Economics,

Osaka University

 

Mailing Address: 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan

E-mail: ishiguro at econ dot osaka-u dot ac dot jp

 

Date of Birth: 13 February 1969

 

Current Academic Position:

Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University (October 2010--)

 

Fields of Interests:

Contract Theory, Economics of Organizations, Search Theory, Development Economics

 

 

Forthcoming Papers:

 

Published Papers:

 

1. ``Relationships and Growth: On the Dynamic Interplay between Relational Contracts and Competitive Markets in Economic Development,” Review of Economic Studies, 83 (2): 629-657, 2016.

2.       ``On the Optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination and Motivation” (joint with Chongwoo Choe), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 28, 447-481, 2012.

3.       ``Contracts, Search, and Organizational Diversity,” European Economic Review, 54, 678-691, 2010.

4.       ``Holdup, Search, and Inefficiency,” Economic Theory, 44, 307-338, 2010..

5.       ``Raising Wages to Deter Entry in Unionized Markets (joint with Laixun Zhao),” Japanese Economic Review, 60, 435-445., 2009

6.       ``Collusion and Discrimination in Organizations,” Journal of Economic Theory 116, 357-369, 2004.

7.       “Signal-Extracting Education in an Overlapping Generations Model” (joint with Koichi Futagami), Economic Theory 24, 129-146, 2004.

8.       ``Comparing Allocations under Asymmetric Information: Coase Theorem Revisited,’’ Economics Letters, Vol. 80, 67-71, 2003.

9.       “Optimal Incentives for Teams: Comment,’’American Economic Review, 92, 1711, 2002.

10.       “Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency,” Journal of Economic Theory 105, 518-530, 2002

11.  "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents (joint with Hideshi Itoh)," Review of Economic Studies, 68, 1-20, 2001.

12.  "Incomplete Contracts and Breach Remedies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics155, 342-361, 1999.

13.  "Entry Deterrence in A Unionized Oligopoly" (joint with Yoshimasa Shirai), Japanese Economic Review, 49, 210-221, 1998.  

14.  "Trade Liberalization with Temporary Protection: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 5, 247-263, 1996.

 

Working Papers:

 

1.  “Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts,” November 2016, [PDF]

2. “Non-Stationary Relational Contracts with Search Market Dynamics,” May 2015, [Slides] , paper updated soon.

3. “Contracts, Conformity, and Signaling with Frictions,” November 2013, [PDF]

4.    “Fair Contracts,” May 2012, [PDF]

5.    “Organizational Dynamics,” May 2012, [PDF]

 

Professional Activities:

Referees for American Economic Review, Games and Economics Behavior, Japanese Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Mathematical Social Science, Research in Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies.

 

Co-Editor, Japanese Economic Review, March 2012—

 

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